FootnoteTV, Footnote Fahrenheit, and more By Stephen Lee
   
Issues: Social Security Examining today's biggest issues from a broader perspective. More info here.


Social Security Reforms (last updated February 6, 2005) (
back to top)

With his 2004 electoral victory, President George W. Bush has called for new efforts to reform Social Security to avert a financial crisis about four decades from now. While Bush has said that many possible reforms are "on the table," most public debate so far has focused on one particular aspect of his plan, which would allow younger workers to divert some of their payroll tax contributions from Social Security into their own personal retirement accounts.

Such accounts would be a departure from the traditional Social Security program, which is actually not a savings or investment program but a program that transfers money from current workers to current retirees. Such accounts arguably would help Social Security's long-term financial future by reducing future expenditures but would entail large amounts of funding in the present ($754 billion over the next 10 years including interest, according to a February 2005 Bush administration estimate) and depend on future economic growth.

For several years, there has been a broad consensus that changes must be made to prevent Social Security from going bankrupt sometime around 2042 and that changes will be less drastic if done sooner rather than later. Social Security's Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability (OASDI) program has been collecting more in payroll tax revenues than it has expended for the past two decades and had as of 2003 more than $1.5 trillion in reserves. Over time, however, the OASDI program's financial picture will change, in part due to demographic changes (further described here) such as longer life expectancies and a lower ratio of workers to beneficiaries.

  • In 2018, according to the 2004 report of the Board of Trustees of the OASDI Trust Funds (summarized on-line here), OASDI annual expenditures will begin exceeding OASDI income excluding interest income. However, the OASDI trust fund will continue to grow because OASDI expenditures will not exceed total income when interest income is counted.

  • In 2027, OASDI annual expenditures will begin exceeding total OASDI income. The federal government would then have to turn to the OASDI Trust Fund and begin using assets which are currently invested in the federal government.

  • In 2042, the OASDI Trust Fund will be exhausted. In order to continue funding Social Security benefits, the federal government would have to use general funds not already dedicated to Social Security. That would mean about $1 trillion in general funds, or about 1.58% of the projected gross domestic product that year.

Such projections are based on the "intermediate" scenario projected by the OASDI trustees. However, other scenarios could unfold with very different financial consequences. The "low cost" scenario projects growing trust funds without exhaustion, and the "high cost" scenario projects the trust funds to be exhausted by 2030.

Many politicians have recognized the problem of waiting until 2042 to do something about Social Security, though many also have argued that the problem does not require immediate action. The harder question is deciding exactly what should be done. There are four basic approaches to addressing Social Security's financial needs, though there are many variations on how such approaches can be implemented.

  • Increase the amount of money coming into Social Security. Social Security could get more money by raising payroll taxes, though this would put more of a burden on workers with lower wages. Social Security also could make all earnings subject to the payroll tax while retaining the current cap around $80,000 so that higher-wage workers would pay more into Social Security but get less back at the end. The Bush administration has opposed raising payroll taxes for slowing economic growth.

  • Decrease the costs of Social Security by reducing the benefits it pays out. Social Security could adjust the formulas used to calculate how much recipients get each year; it could reduce the cost-of-living-adjustment (COLA) that recipients get each year to the benefits set when they retire, increase the number of years used to calculate one's benefits, or raise the normal retirement age. Social Security could also reduce benefits across the board. Social Security could also reduce or eliminate benefits for workers with higher incomes.

  • Transfer money from the federal government's general revenues to Social Security. Social Security generally has funded itself through payroll taxes. The federal government could put additional funds into Social Security, but this would require cuts elsewhere and/or raise the federal debt. During the 2000 presidential campaign, both Al Gore and George W. Bush proposed transferring at least some of the projected budget surpluses into Social Security in this way.

  • Pre-fund future benefits by creating individual personal savings accounts or through direct investments of the trust funds. President George W. Bush has come out strongly in favor of using a portion of each individual's payroll tax contributions to fund individual investment accounts that would either reduce or replace Social Security benefits in the future. This would allow workers to invest some of their payroll taxes themselves with the possibility that they could earn a greater rate of return, but it would have a short-term cost as Social Security would have to replace the funds that it otherwise would receive.

The Bush administration has focused most of its attention thus far on creating personal retirement accounts. According to a plan it published in February 2005, "Strengthening Social Security for the 21st Century" (on-line here), such accounts would have the following features:

  • Workers would have the choice to create such a personal retirement account or not.

  • Workers who have PRAs would eventually invest 4 percentage points of their payroll taxes each year into such accounts, with a maximum dollar cap.

  • Workers who have PRAs could choose to invest their PRA contributions in several investment funds.

  • Workers would have to pay some administration fees. The Bush administration has said that such fees would be low and would be mostly for recordkeeping done by the federal government, though critics worry that fees would go mostly to Wall Street.

  • Workers would not be allowed to access their accounts until they retire.

Some countries have adopted a form of individual retirement accounts. Chile was the first to replace its pay-as-you-go system with individual accounts, with mixed success. According to a June 2003 Social Security Administration report (on-line here), Chile has seen an overall rate of return from 1981 to 2003 of about 10.5 percent before administrative fees but has seen lower rates of return in recent years. In 1999, a Social Security Administration official testified (on-line here) that rates of return in preceding years had been too small to cover administrative fees and had been so low or negative that a Chilean official had urged workers to delay retiring until the market regained strength.

In any event, creating such accounts would not be enough to avert Social Security's financial problems. Additional reforms, such as increasing the retirement age, would also be needed.

Sources: The 2004 report by the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds is available on-line here. The Bush administration's February 2005 plan for Social Security reforms, "Strengthening Social Security for the 21st Century," is on-line here. The Social Security Advisory Board, a bipartisan advisory board created in 1994, is on-line here; the SSAB's July 2001 report, "Social Security: Why Action Should be Taken Sooner" is available there. The President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security, which was created by President George W. Bush in May 2001, is on-line here.


Demographic Changes affecting Social Security (last updated February 6, 2005) (
back to top)

Much of the concern about Social Security's long-term future is based in the United States' changing demographics. Social Security was adopted when the age structure of the United States was more of a triangle growing out from a relatively small number of elderly, but this age structure has become more weighted towards the elderly over time and is expected to continue doing so.

Sources: Age-structure population data is available via the U.S. Census on-line here. Data on the ratio of workers to beneficiaries is from Table IV.B2 of the 2004 OASDI Trustees report, on-line here.


A history of the 1983 commission and reforms

Dealing with Social Security has been a political minefield for presidents in the past, and one recourse for navigating it has been through bipartisan commissions. The last time that Social Security was amended in substantial ways was during the crisis of the early 1980s and was the result of work by a bipartisan commission chaired by future Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan, though reports indicate that the commission was just the public cover for a smaller group of key legislators.

Yet one more victim of the stagnated, high-inflation economy of the late 1970s, Social Security faced exhaustion of its Trust Fund by the early 1980s. Social Security began running deficits in 1975, when it spent $1.5 billion more in benefits than it took in through taxes and continued to do so for the next seven years (this was not the first time that Social Security spent more than it took in, but the first time that it did so for more than two years in a row).

Ronald Reagan came into office in 1981 and began the new economic policies to stimulate the economy that would become known as Reaganomics. The Social Security component, as developed by White House Budget Director David Stockman, was announced in May 1981; it would have cut benefits dramatically for early retirees and also reduce benefits in other ways, though it would not have raised the normal retirement age and would not have increased payroll tax rates. A political disaster, these measures were quickly criticized by congressional leaders in both parties and the White House backed away soon after.

In September 1981, Reagan then turned, as many presidents did before and have done since, to a bipartisan commission. The 15-member National Commission on Social Security Reform was picked by committee: Reagan picked five (including chairman Alan Greenspan) and promised to name Democrats as two of his five picks, the House majority (under Democratic speaker of the House Tip O'Neill) got three picks, the House minority two, the Senate majority (under Republican majority leader Howard Baker) got three, the Senate minority two.

Hopes were not high for the commission. It was the fourth national study commission on social security in less than three years, and some felt that the commission was unnecessary and would simply delay real action for months. The commission's membership was unwieldy and it failed to achieve significant compromises. Public meetings in November 1982 collapsed without any plan in place for Social Security or even for the commission to do any more substantive work.

With the commission about to expire without success and given the urgency of the crisis (Social Security trustees said earlier that year that checks would not be mailed in July 1983 unless a rescue plan was in place), action took place in two spheres. First, Congress approved measures that allowed Social Security to borrow billions of dollars from its companion funds in order to get through the next few months.

Second, less publicly, the Reagan White House, via David Stockman, decided to convene a smaller group of White House staff and key commission members that could work out the kind of compromise that the full commission did not. Democratic Senator Patrick Moynihan wrote in an op-ed piece that he had been the one to re-open negotiations in early January 1983 with Republican Senator Bob Dole, but Paul Light reported in his 1985 book on the negotiations "Artful Work" that Moynihan had already been involved with negotiations for weeks and had been rewriting history to defuse potential Democratic opposition to a Republican-initiated process.

Operating mostly secretly, the "gang of nine," as Light dubbed it, worked out a compromise in less than two weeks and then the proposal was given the stamp of bipartisan approval by the national commission, which voted 12-3 to support it (the three in opposition were Republicans).

As enacted into law just three months later, these reforms included moving up already-scheduled payroll tax increases, delaying cost-of-living adjustments to reduce benefits, taxing federal and non-profit workers who had not been subject to the Social Security taxes before, and other measures. The amendments moved quickly through Congress and were signed into law on April 20, 1983.

Sources: Sylvester J. Schieber and John B. Shoven, The Real Deal: The history and future of Social Security (Yale University Press, 1999). Paul Light, Artful Work: The politics of Social Security reform (McGraw-Hill, 1985).

 

Index / Home
FootnoteTV
Footnote Fahrenheit
Footnote Media
Issues
Cases
Resources
Footnote Comics
Site FAQ
Search via Google

Election 2004

Issues

*Abortion
*Africa
*Affirmative Action
*AIDS
*American Identity
*Americas
*Assassinations
*Asia
*Budget
*Campaign Finance
*Challenger Remembered
*Crime
*Death Penalty
*Defense
*Drugs
*Economy
*Education
*Elections
*Energy
*Environment
*Europe
*Evolution and Anti-Evolution
*Gay and Lesbian Issues
*Guns
*Health
*Health Care
*History
*History : World War II
*International Relations
*Internet and Technology
*Iraq
*Labor
*Middle East
*Migrations
*Political Parties
*Process
*Public Arts
*Reparations
*Religion
*Science
*Sex
*Social Security
*Space
*State-Specific Issues
*Supreme Court Review
*Terrorism
 
Google
WWW Newsaic / FootnoteTV / Footnote Fahrenheit
DISCLAIMER. The materials contained in this website have been prepared by Stephen Lee ("Author") for informational purposes only and do not contain or constitute legal advice. These materials may not reflect the most current legal developments, verdicts or settlements. Furthermore, this information should in no way be taken as an indication of future results. Reading this website is not intended to create, and your receipt and/or use of the information contained herein, does not constitute an attorney/client relationship. You should not act upon this information without seeking professional counsel. Reproduction, distribution or republication of material contained within this website is prohibited unless the prior permission of Author has been obtained.

(C) Copyright 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 Stephen Lee. All rights reserved. Newsaic and FootnoteTV are registered service marks of Stephen Lee. Mirror Law and Footnote Comics are service marks of Stephen Lee. More information available here. Comments or suggestions to the Site Editor.