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Issues : The Internet and Technology Examining today's biggest issues from a broader perspective. More info here.

  • >On-line File Swapping (RIAA has taken actions to stop practice of downloading music)
  • On-line Content Regulation (in reviewing Congress's second attempt to regulate certain content on the Internet, Supreme Court remands case for further review, thus continuing to prevent the federal government from enforcing 1998 law)
  • On-line Privacy (Federal Trade Commission recommended in July 2000 some legislation to regulate on-line advertising industry practices)
  • Internet Access (more than half the American population was using the Internet from some location by fall of 2001)

RIAA v. Online File Swapping (last updated September 22, 2003) (back to top)

Trying to stop the widespread practice of downloading copyrighted music without paying for it, the music recording industry, led by the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), has taken several approaches. The most recent - and perhaps most controversial - approach has been to sue individual users who have downloaded more than 1,000 songs for copyright infringement, which RIAA members began doing on September 8, 2003.

The RIAA has defended this action as a necessary move to increase public awareness that file-swapping copyrighted music through services such as Napster or Kazaa is illegal and could result in drastic consequences. At the same time, the RIAA has also announced that the industry would grant de facto "amnesty" to those users who identify themselves and pledge to stop sharing music on the Internet.

Targeting Individual Users

Several federal courts have stated that individuals who use such services to swap copyrighted music are violating federal copyright law. However, until 2003, the RIAA did not bring legal action against such individuals but against the file-sharing services such as Napster and Kazaa that enabled such copyright infringement.

Individuals who willfully infringe another's copyright can face stiff fines, possible criminal liability, and other punishments. Under section 504(c) of the federal copyright law (on-line here), copyright infringement can be punished with civil fines generally from $750 to $30,000 per copyrighted work (such fines can be raised at a court's discretion to $150,000 per copyrighted work if the infringement was willful). Copyright infringement is also a criminal offense when done for "commercial advantage or private financial gain."

In addition, many universities now inform their students that file-swapping is illegal, and that copyright infringement can be punished with school disciplinary action ranging up to expulsion. In 2002, the RIAA began sending letters to many universities urging them to crack down on copyright infringement.

Chronological Overview

A brief overview of the ongoing battle follows:

  • May 1999: Founded by Shawn Fanning, then a freshman at Boston's Northeastern University, Napster incorporates and begins beta-testing its software. It quickly becomes very popular and has about 40 million members at the peak of its existence.

  • December 1999: The Recording Industry Association of America sues Napster for copyright infringement in the federal district court for the Northern District of California.

  • July 2000: Issuing a preliminary injunction, District Judge Marilyn Hall Patel (N.D. California) orders Napster shut down by July 28, 2000 pending trial, saying that company was guilty of "wholesale" copyright infringement. This order is stayed pending appeal, and is ultimately imposed with some modifications in March 2001.

  • February 12, 2001: The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals holds that Napster users infringe copyright holders' rights of reproduction and distribution, that Napster users are probably not protected by the fair-use doctrine, that Napster is probably liable as a contributory infringer, and that Napster must police the use of its software "to its fullest extent" to escape liability as a vicarious infringer. The amended opinion in this case, A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., is on-line here.

  • July 2, 2001: Napster shuts down its entire service to comply with Patel's modified order.

  • August 2002: Invoking the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, the RIAA begins trying to force internet service providers to disclose information about users who are engaged in copyright infringement. In January 2003, a U.S. district judge in Washington D.C. orders Verizon to disclose information about a particular subscriber; this order is later affirmed.

  • April 2003: The recording industry begins targeting individual users, suing four students at Michigan Technological University, Princeton University and Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute who allegedly ran networks offering hundreds of thousands of songs for downloading. The four students reportedly agreed several weeks later to pay fines.

  • April 2003: U.S. District Judge Stephen Wilson (C.D. California) rules that programs such as Grokster's Kazaa and Streamcast's Morpheus operate differently enough from Napster to not be liable for direct copyright infringement itself. At the same time, Wilson recognizes that individual users of such programs do infringe copyrights.

  • September 8, 2003: The recording industry files lawsuits against 261 individuals for copyright infringement.

Sources: The Recording Industry Association of America is on-line here; its Sept. 8, 2003 press release about suing individual users is on-line here. Civil and criminal penalties for violating federal copyright law are in Chapter 5 of federal copyright law, on-line here. For a sample college policy about file sharing, Dartmouth College's is on-line here; its statement on the consequences of illegal copyright infringement is on-line here.


On-line Content Regulation (last updated May 14, 2002) (back to top)

Since the mid-1990s, the federal government has struggled to find a way of regulating content on the Internet. A statute criminalizing the communication of certain kinds of material on-line was struck down as unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in 1996, and the federal government has been barred from enforcing a subsequent law since early 1999.

On May 13, 2002, the United States Supreme Court ensured a continued limbo for the 1998 law, known as the Child Online Protection Act, by sending the matter back to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals for further deliberations. The COPA was first declared unconstitutional on several grounds by a federal district court in Philadelphia in early 1999, and this decision was upheld on only one ground by the Third Circuit in June 2000. The Supreme Court reversed that basis for the Third Circuit's decision in May 2002 but declined to address other grounds by which the COPA might be unconstitutional.

While recent efforts have focused on criminal statutes that threaten people who distribute certain material on-line, there are other ways of regulating such content, many of which are already in practice today to varying degrees. The Commission on Child Online Protection, which was created by the COPA but was funded privately, studied such methods and released a report in October 2000. Methods studied by the commission include:

  • Education, such as on-line information resources and family education programs
  • Filtering/blocking software by servers or clients to block access to particular content sources
  • Labeling and rating systems (such as is currently done for movies)
  • Age verification systems (such as requiring the use of a credit-card)
  • New top-level domain/zoning (this is not currently being done, but would reserve domains such as .xxx or .adult specifically for material that might be considered "harmful to minors")
  • Increased prosecution under existing laws (could have high deterrent effect, but raises privacy risks)
In its report, the commission concluded that "the most effective current means of protecting children from content on the Internet harmful to minors include: aggressive efforts towards public education, consumer empowerment, increased resources for enforcement of existing laws, and greater use of existing technologies."

Even so, attention has focused in recent years on the two federal criminal statutes which were enacted in 1996 and 1998, but have never been enforced due to constitutional problems. States have also passed similar criminal statutes, though these have also met with First Amendment problems.

The Communications Decency Act of 1996 prohibited the knowing transmission over the Internet of obscene or indecent messages to anyone under the age of 18 years. It also prohibited any individual from knowingly sending or displaying on the Internet certain "patently offensive" material in a manner available to persons under the age of 18 years. If accused of such a crime, people could affirmatively defend against these charges and effectively overcome a guilty verdict by showing they had taken reasonable actions or installed age systems to prevent access by minors.

In 1997, the Supreme Court struck down almost all provisions of the CDA as violating the First Amendment (Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844). Noting that existing technology did not effectively allow people sending content over the Internet to screen out minors while still allowing access by adults, the Court said the CDA's breadth was "wholly unprecedented" and that its affirmative defenses were not narrowly tailored. The only part of the CDA to survive the Supreme Court's ruling was a ban on the knowing transmission of obscene messages.

Congress tried again in 1998, this time narrowing the legislation's scope and tailoring the statutory language to the Supreme Court's opinions on the CDA and on obscenity in general. The resulting Child Online Protection Act thus did not address e-mail messages but focused solely on material displayed on the World Wide Web. It did not address all communications, but only those made "for commercial purposes." It did not ban material that was "indecent" or "patently offensive," but only those that were "harmful to minors," which it defined along the lines of the Supreme Court's obscenity standard.

Under the COPA, which is codified as 47 U.S.C. 231, anyone who violated its provisions faced a fine of at most $50,000 and six months of jail. As under the CDA, anyone convicted under the statute could affirmatively defend him- or herself by showing that he or she had restricted access by minors by requiring use of a credit card or some other age-verifying method.

In challenging the COPA, the American Civil Liberties Union and other groups challenged it on many grounds, and the district court first enjoining the COPA did so on a variety of grounds. However, when appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, that court based its ruling solely on one part of the law's definition of "harmful to minors." That term was based on general obscenity law and tracked the language set out in the Supreme Court's 1973 opinion in a group of obscenity-pornography cases known collectively as Miller v California. Under Miller, material was legally obscene if:

  • The "average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find the work as a whole as appealing to prurient interests,

  • The work depicts or describes sexual conduct in a "patently offensive" way, AND

  • The work as a whole "lacks serious literary, artistic, or scientific value."

In general obscenity law, this definition allows for different standards based on location as to the first two points, so that people of different communities could differ on whether a work was prurient or offensive in its descriptions of sex. However, the Supreme Court later made clear that the value of a work was to be measured by an overall standard, not by local standards. For example, in light of its general acclaim and its being named best book of the 20th century by some critics, James Joyce's book Ulysses, which was officially banned from the United States until 1933, probably should be seen as having literary value everywhere, and not just in select places or communities.

Because Web publishers cannot limit their geographical reach, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the COPA's reliance on "contemporary community standards" would mean that Web publishers would have to take account of all jurisdictions throughout the United States and thus would have to hold themselves to the standards of the community most likely to be offended. Such a standard would be overbroad, the Third Circuit said, and so concerned them that "we are persuaded that this aspect of COPA, without reference to its other provisions, must lead inexorably to a holding of the likelihood of the unconstitutionality of the entire COPA statute."

In its May 2002 decision, the Supreme Court rejected the Third Circuit's thinking but did not decide the overall issue as to whether the COPA was constitutional. In an opinion written by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Supreme Court held only that the COPA was not rendered unconstitutional simply by virtue of its use of the "contemporary community standards" language and sent the case back to the Third Circuit for further deliberation.

For more on obscenity in general, go here.

Sources: The Supreme Court's May 12, 2002 opinion in Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union is on-line here. Other cases, such as the Third Circuit's 2000 opinion, Reno v. ACLU, 217 F.3d 162, are available through Findlaw.com. The American Civil Liberties Union has collected its resources on the case here. The Commission on Child Online Protection's October 2000 report to Congress is on-line here.


On-line Privacy (last updated April 30, 2002) (back to top)

Electronic-commerce practices such as the use of "cookies" without consumers' knowledge have raised privacy concerns with legislators and regulators, who have urged industry self-regulation but are also considering legislation as well.

In July 2000, the Federal Trade Commission recommended that Congress enact some basic legislation to regulate the on-line advertising industry's practice of "on-line profiling," noting that the industry's self-regulation efforts were commendable but insufficient. The leading on-line advertising companies formed an organization (the Network Advertising Initiative) in November 1999 to develop a framework for self-regulation, and the resulting NAI principles emphasize providing notice to consumers about advertisers' profiling activities and giving consumers the ability to not participate.

"Nonetheless, backstop legislation addressing online profiling is still required to fully ensure that consumers' privacy is protected online. For while NAI's current membership constitutes over 90 percent of the network advertising industry in terms of revenue and ads served, only legislation can compel the remaining 10 percent of the industry to comply," the FCC said in its 2000 report.

Some bills regulating on-line profiling are now moving slowly through Congress but may have a difficult time being enacted. For one thing, the FTC's own position may be changing. In October 2001, new FTC chairman Timothy J. Muris noted that it was "too soon to conclude that we can fashion workable legislation" regulating on-line privacy. Muris noted that legislating broad-based privacy concerns is difficult, that it was unclear why regulation should be limited to on-line profiling and not off-line profiling as well, and that the slowing of Internet growth emphasized the need to understand the costs of regulation.

The Internet advertising industry grew considerably from 1996 to 2000 but slowed somewhat in 2001. According to the Internet Advertising Bureau, revenues went from $267 million in 1996 to $8.225 billion in 2000 (an increase of 30 times). Revenues declined in the first three quarters of 2001, reflecting the weaker economy.

On-line profiling refers to industry practices to gather data on the consumers who view their ads, primarily through the use of "cookies" which track a user's actions on the Internet. The information is usually linked to the identification number of the advertising network's cookie on the consumer's computer rather than the a specific name and is thus often anonymous, but the information can be identified with a particular person either by the consumer providing that information or by the web site retrieving such information from the consumer's computer.

A FTC survey in 2000 found that of the top 100 sites, 78 percent allowed advertisers to place cookies ontheir sites, but only 61 percent of those sites disclosed that fact. As for a random sample of busy sites, 57 percent allowed advertisers to place cookies on their sites, but only 22 percent of those sites mentioned such cookies or data collection practices by advertisers in their privacy policies.

While most on-line privacy concerns are related to advertising industry practices, there have been some concerning hardware. In January 1999, Intel announced that its Pentium III chip would include a processor serial number which would be electronically implemented rather than placed on the chip's exterior; the chip would allow businesses or certain software to track those computers. The PSN was widely unpopular, and several computer manufacturers took steps to disable or limit the chip. Intel resisted some privacy advocates' demands to recall the chip, but has not used the PSN in subsequent models.

Sources: The FTC's July 2000 report to Congress on on-line privacy is on-line here. FTC Chairman Timothy J. Muris's October 4, 2001 speech on privacy is on-line here. The Internet Advertising Bureau, online here, tracks the industry in reports available on the site. Information on Intel's Processor Serial Number is available from Intel here and here; the privacy advocacy organization Junkbusters was one of the most vocal critics of the PSN and has some information on-line here.


Internet Access (last updated April 3, 2002) (back to top)

Computer and Internet use by Americans have grown substantially in the past few years, with computer use increasing overall at 5.3 percent per year since 1997 and Internet use overall by about 20 percent since 1998, according to a report based on census data.

By September 2001, more than half the American population and more than half of all households were using the Internet from some location, and this increase was seen in all groups. That still leaves a large but shrinking segment of the population that was "unconnected," people who are generally of lower income, have low levels of overall education, and are of certain minority groups. There were about 122.4 million "unconnected" Americans as of September 2001, about 46.1 percent of the total population, down from 198.9 million in October 1997.

While about 60 percent of white and Asian-American people used the Internet as of September 2001, only 40 percent of blacks and 32 percent of Hispanics did, though all groups have shown increased use since 1997. Internet use also varies by education and family income level.

The following charts show how Internet use from any location has increased by race, income, and educational attainment. As for other common classifications, Internet use is about the same between men and women (53.9 and 53.8 percent, respectively, in September 2001), and between urban and rural households (54.2 and 52.9 percent, respectively, in September 2001).

Cost is a commonly cited factor for households that have never had the Internet at home or that have disconnected Internet access. According to a September 2001 survey, the largest specific reason that people gave for why they don't have the Internet at home was that it was too expensive. For the 3.3 percent of American households that had disconnected Internet access as of September 2001, the most common reasons for doing so were the cost (22 percent of households), not wanting the Internet (20 percent), and access elsewhere (11 percent). Other reasons included not having a computer (14 percent) and computer capabilities (11 percent).

Sources: A Nation Online: How Americans Are Expanding Their Use of the Internet, a February 2002 report by the National Telecommunication and Information Administration and the Economic and Statistics Administration, on-line here.


Copyright Term Extension Act (last updated January 17, 2003) (back to top)

If not for the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Mickey Mouse would have entered the public domain in 2003. But with the CTEA as good law, which was upheld as constitutional by the United States Supreme Court in January 2003, anyone using the character or image of Mickey Mouse for commercial purposes and without permission until 2023 would be liable for copyright infringement.

A group ranging from Internet publishers to college associations sought to undo the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 through a legal challenge, Eldred v. Reno, later renamed Eldred v. Ashcroft. They argued that the CTEA impairs First Amendment rights and that the Constitution does not allow Congress to pass such an extension.

In February 2001, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously rejected the first argument, repeating that there was no First Amendment right to make commercial use of someone else's copyrighted works. However, the court did show some disagreement on the second argument. While the majority of the judges ruled that Congress was empowered to enact the CTEA, one dissented and said that Congress cannot extend copyrights when the extension simply prolongs a holder's control and does not advance artistic ends.

In January 2003, the United States Supreme Court similarly upheld the CTEA in a 7-2 decision written by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. The Court majority found that Congress had the power to extend copyrights and that there was no indication Congress was trying to create a "regime of perpetual copyrights." Similarly, the Court majority rejected the First Amendment challenges to the CTEA, noting the "limited monopolies" created by copyright were compatible with First Amendment principles.

Congress's power to protect copyrights stems from the Commerce Clause. Under Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, Congress has the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries" (go here for more constitutional language).

The case is now going to the Supreme Court for a final decision. The Supreme Court agreed in February 2002 to hear the case (technically, it granted certiorari to the plaintiffs' petition), will hear arguments in the fall of 2002, and will decide sometime before the spring of 2003.

A copyright essentially is the right of an author to control the reproduction and distribution of his or her intellectual creation. Particular expressions can be copyrighted, though the basic idea cannot (Mickey Mouse can be copyrighted, but the idea of a cute animal character cannot). Even though the holder of a copyright controls the reproduction, adaptation, distribution and display of the work, certain kinds of uses (such as for parody and for review) are still permitted under the doctrine of fair use.

From 1909 to 1976, copyrighted works could be protected for a total of 56 years (28 years for an initial term, and 28 more years in a renewal term). The Copyright Act was revised in 1976 so that copyrights would endure for a period depending on the kind of copyright holder. For an individual author, then copyright would last for a period of 50 years from his or her death. Copyrights in other works, such as those created "work-for-hire," would last for 75 years from publication or 100 years from creation. The CTEA extended these periods by 20 years each.

Under the CTEA, works published more than 95 years ago are in the public domain. Works can also be in the public domain if the copyright holder does not protect his or her copyright, which is why companies like Disney occasionally seem to come down on people who do not necessarily intend to do the copyright holder any harm, such as the creator of a fan website.

Sources: Eldred v. Ashcroft was decided by the Supreme Court on January 15, 2003, and is available on-line via Findlaw.com here. Information on the plaintiff's case is on-line here. Harvard's Open Law Project also has collected documents on the case, on-line here.

 

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