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| Issues: American Identity
Profile of the United States (back to top) Here are a collection of essays and graphs showing a profile of the United States, based on data provided by the U.S. Census and other institutions. I will supplement this data as more information comes forward, especially as more results from the 2000 Census become available. The United States resident population is about 274 million. Race    Religion (back to top) Federal law bars the U.S. Census from asking about the religious identity of the American population, which means that any religious profile has to be calculated and estimated from other sources, such as academics, institutions, and other groups. The Graduate Center of the City University of New York has conducted two surveys of religious identification, first in 1990 and again in 2001, both based on random digit-dialed telephone calls (113,723 persons questioned in 1990, 50,281 in 2001). Here are some highlights from these National Surveys of Religious Identification:
Marital Status (back to top)   Census taking (last updated September 3, 2001) (back to top) No one knows the actual population of the United States. It changes every day with new births and deaths, is too mobile, lives in too many different circumstances, and is too busy, too inundated with junk mail, or too concerned with privacy to be counted properly. That being said, the United States Census Bureau is authorized by Congress to conduct an "actual enumeration" of the population of the United States every ten years in order to get a measure of the country and to apportion congressional representation amongst the States. Most of the political and legal controversy over the 1990 and 2000 censuses focuses on how the Census Bureau handles the problem of the "undercount," the estimated amount of the population that it fails to count by traditional enumeration methods. Specifically, the controversy has focused on the Census Bureau's proposed use of statistical sampling to adjust the results of mailed questionnaires and door-to-door census taking; such sampling is probably constitutional but cannot be used for reapportionment purposes. The undercount, first measured by demographic analysis based on birth and death records, affects how political power and federal funding are distributed throughout the country. In 1980, the undercount was 2.8 million people, about 1.2 percent of the population; this amount was the lowest since the undercount was first determined for the 1940 census. In 1990, the undercount went up to 4.7 million people, about 1.8 percent of the population. Undercounts generally miss minorities and people who are highly mobile or living in nontraditional environments. Most concretely, it affects the makeup of the House of Representatives. In 1910, Congress decided to stop the growth in the size of the House, freezing the number of seats to 435. From then on, re-apportionment has been a zero-sum game, with one state's gain being another's loss. Congress responded to this decision in 1940 by removing a prior requirement that all districts be compact, contiguous, and of equal size, which meant that while seats were reapportioned amongst states, they could be drawn to disproportionately favor rural areas or certain populations; this has led to many lawsuits over redistricting. The Census Bureau has adapted over the decades to improve its methods and reduce the undercount; door-to-door census takers are only one part of the "enumeration" process. In 1970, the Census Bureau sent questionnaires out by mail for the first time, using door-to-door census takers only for those households that did not respond. And in 1990, the Census Bureau undertook a massive outreach program through public-service announcements. While preparing for the 1990 census, the Census Bureau considered for the first time using statistical sampling - specifically a post-enumeration survey (PES) that would allegedly determine the undercount more accurately - to adjust the results of the enumeration phase. However, the Republican Commerce Department announced in 1987 that it was canceling the PES. This meant that the 1990 census would not incorporate any statistical adjustments or sampling, and that the results of the "enumeration" phase consisting of mail forms and door-to-door counting, would stand as final. New York, expecting that a census without a PES would hurt the state, then sued the Census Bureau. Faced with the lawsuit, the Commerce Department withdrew its decision to cancel the post-enumeration survey for further consideration, conducted the PES, and then in 1991 decided not to adjust the census results based on the PES (according to the PES, non-blacks were undercounted in 1990 by 1.7 percent, whereas blacks by 4.8 percent and Hispanics by 5.2 percent). New York challenged Commerce Secretary Robert A. Mosbacher's decision as arbitrary and unreasonable, but in 1996 the Supreme Court ultimately upheld Mosbacher's authority to make the decision. This decision did not address constitutional or legislation issues, only the procedural issue of an executive official's authority to make a decision. The 2000 Census was similarly marked by a new debate over statistical sampling. In 1997, the Census Bureau (now under a Democratic president) announced that it would use statistical sampling in the 2000 census. The Republican Congress and President Clinton fought over the use of statistical sampling, and finally Congress approved the Census Bureau's plan but allowed for quick review by the United States Supreme Court. In January 1999, the Supreme Court held that a 1975 provision, read in the context of prior bans on statistical sampling, did ban the use of statistical sampling for purposes of reapportionment. The relevant section of U.S. Code Chapter 13, Section 195 reads as follows: "Except for the determination of population for purposes of apportionment of Representatives in Congress among the several States, the Secretary [of Commerce] shall, if he considers it feasible, authorize the use of the statistical method known as 'sampling' in carrying out the provisions of this title." This, the majority of the court held, meant that the Census Bureau was actually required to use sampling for most census purposes, but that the pre-1975 prohibition on sampling for purposes of reapportionment remained in place and continue to this day. This time, the Supreme Court based its decision on its interpretation of federal laws, but it still did not address whether the Constitution would allow statistical sampling. Generally, courts have read the "actual enumeration" phrase in the Constitution's Census Clause to refer to the population to be measured, not on any particular method of counting. Thus, statistical sampling is probably constitutional and is actually required for some purposes such as distribution of federal funding; moreover, Congress probably could amend current federal law to allow the use of statistical sampling in subsequent censuses. How much impact adjustment would have had is unclear. Many of the state and local governments that pressed hardest for adjustment in 1990 later found that such adjustments would not have gone in their favor had they been implemented. It is also very difficult to determine which states would be most likely to gain or lose a seat, since reapportionment is based on entirely new calculations based using "the method of equal proportions," which gives each state one seat and then distributes the remaining 385 seats based on a newly-calculated list of "priority values." Sources: Census Bureau, Report to Congress: The Plan for Census 2000 (revised and reissued August 1997), available on-line through the Census Bureau's website available here. Department of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives, No. 98-404 (1999). Margo J. Anderson and Stephen E. Fienberg, Who Counts? The Politics of Census-Taking in Contemporary America (Russel Sage Foundation, 1999). Peter Skerry, Counting on the Census? Race, Group Identity, and the Evasion of Politics (Brookings Institution, 2000). Harvey Choldin, Looking for the Last Percent: The controversy over census undercounts (Rutgers University Press, 1994). Flag-burning (last updated August 27, 2001) (back to top) Political battles over whether the desecration of the United States flag is a protected act under the First Amendment first arose in the 1960s and 1970s, but did not become a hot-button issue until after a controversial Supreme Court opinion in 1989. The next year, Congress passed a flag-protection law which was struck down as unconstitutional; some continue to push for a constitutional amendment that would overrule the Supreme Court's decision and thus make it permissible for states or the federal government to criminalize such acts. The Supreme Court first dealt with flag-desecration cases in the late 1960s and early 1970s but managed to avoid dealing at the time with First Amendment issues. Instead, the Court overturned criminal convictions under New York, Massachusetts and Washington State laws on grounds of vagueness and factual specifics. Such laws remained on the books and 48 out of 50 states had some kind of flag-protection law by the time the Court finally dealt squarely with First Amendment issues in the 1989 case of Texas v. Johnson. Gregory Lee Johnson's case arose five years earlier, when he was one of many protestors at the 1984 Republican National Convention in Dallas. At the end of one demonstration, Johnson displayed an American flag, doused it with kerosene, and then set it on fire. As he did so, protesters chanted, "America, the red, white and blue, we spit on you." Afterwards, a witness collected the flag's remains and buried it in his background. Johnson was the only protestor charged with a crime, and the only crime he was charged with was desecration of a venerated object, specifically, the U.S. flag. He was convicted, sentenced to one year in prison, and fined $2,000. This conviction was overturned by a Texas court, and prosecutors appealed the case up to the United States Supreme Court. Texas tried to justify the law under two interests, first preventing breaches of the peace, and second preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity. The Court, in a 5-4 majority, held that (1) the state's interest in maintaining order was not actually relevant to Johnson's particular case and that (2) the law unconstitutionally suppressed free expression. "If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea offensive or disagreeable," Justice Brennan wrote for the majority. "To conclude that the Government may permit designated symbols to be used to communicate only a limited set of messages would be to enter territory having no discernible or defensible boundaries ... To do so, we would be forced to consult our own political preferences, and impose them on the citizenry, in the very way that the First Amendment forbids us to do." On the other hand, Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion in which he held up the flag as "not simply another 'idea' or 'point of view' competing for recognition in the marketplace of ideas. Millions [of] Americans regard it with an almost mystical reverence regardless of what sort of social, political, or philosophical beliefs they may have." Rehnquist distinguished flag burning from free speech, calling it more of "an inarticulate grunt or roar that [is] most likely to be indulged in not to express any particular idea, but to antagonize others." The decision was extremely unpopular with the general public, and sparked outcry. In response, Congress passed the Flag Protection Act of 1989 (some politicians had wanted to try for a constitutional amendment but decided to try a more carefully-tailored statute first). The law was immediately tested and declared unconstitutional in the case of United States v Eichman by another 5-4 vote. Again writing for the majority, Brennan said that the new law still suppressed the content of free expression. "Government may create national symbols, promote them, and encourage their respectful treatment. But the [Act] goes well beyond this by criminally proscribing expressive conduct because of its likely communicative impact. We are aware that desecration of the flag is deeply offensive to many. But the same might be said, for example, of virulent ethnic and religious epithets, vulgar repudiations of the draft, and scurrilous caricatures," he wrote. "Punishing desecration of the flag dilutes the very freedom that makes this emblem so revered, and worth revering." With the vote so close both times, a change in Court dynamics could allow a more carefully designed flag-protection law to stand. But proponents have looked more to a constitutional amendment that would carve out an exception to the First Amendment and thus make the Supreme Court uphold laws subsequently. If adopted, such an amendment would be the first to amend an original provision of the Bill of Rights and only the fifth to overrule a Supreme Court decision. Amending the Constitution is done usually by Congress proposing by a 2/3 vote amendments for ratification by 3/4 of the states (another method is for 2/3 of the states to call for a constitutional convention for such a purpose). In 1990, Congress narrowly failed to send such an amendment proposal to the states, with the House coming up 34 votes short and the Senate 9 votes. In 1995, the House did approve such an amendment by a 312-120 vote, but the Senate fell three votes short with a 63-46 vote. Sources: Gerald Gunther and Kathleen B. Sullivan, Constitutional Law (Foundation Press, 13th edition, 1997). Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990). Pledge of Allegiance (last updated June 27, 2002) (back to top) When first codified in 1942 by Congress, the Pledge of Allegiance originally was "I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America and to the Republic for which it stands, one Nation indivisible, with liberty and justice for all." Twelve years later, in 1954, Congress added the words "under God" after the word "nation," largely to distinguish the United States from atheistic nations under Communist rule. In June 2002, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the federal appellate court for most of the Western United States, held that Congress's 1954 action was unconstitutional in a 2-1 decision that was widely criticized by the public and that will surely be appealed to the Supreme Court. See Newdow v. U.S. Congress (9th Cir. June 26, 2002). Pending a higher ruling, however, the Pledge of Allegiance effectively reverts back to the original 1942 wording for the states covered by the Ninth Circuit. "The statement that the United States is a nation 'under God' is an endorsement of religion. It is a profession of religious belief, namely, a belief in monotheism," Judge Alfred T. Goodwin wrote for the majority opinion. "To recite the Pledge is not to describe the United States; instead, it is to swear allegiance to the values for which the flag stands: unity, indivisibility, liberty, justice, and - since 1953 - monotheism. The text of the official Pledge, codified in federal law, impermissibly takes a position with respect to the purely religious question of the existence and identity of God." Dissenting from the majority opinion, Circuit Judge Ferdinand Fernandez argued that the Pledge and similar references in public life to a monotheistic, Judeo-Christian God did not threaten the First Amendment. "Such phrases as 'In God We Trust," or "under God" have no tendency to establish a religion in this country or to suppress anyone's exercise, or non-exercise of religion, except in the fevered eye of persons who most fervently would like to drive all tincture of religion out of the public life of our polity." The case was brought by Michael Newdow, an atheist who sued on behalf of his daughter, who attends a public elementary school in California. California law mandates "appropriate patriotic exercises" at the start of each day, and Newdow's daughter's school specifically required the giving of the Pledge of Allegiance. While the Supreme Court has never directly addressed the constitutionality of the current Pledge of Allegiance, it has suggested in tangentially-related cases that it would allow such references to God to stand. Nonetheless, the Court has limited the effect of the Pledge in the past. In 1943, the Court ruled that students could not be required to recite the pledge in its original wording; at the time, West Virginia threatened students who failed to recite the pledge with expulsion and with juvenile-delinquency charges. See West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). For other issues about American identity, such as flag-burning, go here. Sources: Cases are available via Findlaw.com. Official English (last updated August 29, 2001) (back to top) English is the most commonly-spoken language in the United States, with 86 percent of the population in 1990 speaking only English at home, but it is still not the official language of the United States. Since 1981, however, a political movement has worked to designate English as such in the states and at the federal level. This Official English movement has achieved success in about half the states, and Congress has considered such legislation several times without concrete results. Substantively, the debate over Official English usually deals with two topics: the government's use of languages other than English in the conduct of government business, including publications and ceremonies, and the government's support for bilingual education. It does not involve proposals to require people to speak only English in their homes or in private conversations. But the debate also seems to touch deeper nerves about American self-identity and the uncertain balance between immigrants' assimilation and their maintaining cultural separateness within the United States. Official English proponents say that making English the country's official language would encourage the assimilation of immigrants who cannot fully participate as citizens. Critics say that such a policy would only penalize those who currently do not speak English, deprive bilingual speakers of access to their heritage, and is of only symbolic value to a threatened-white majority. The modern Official English movement began in 1981 when Senator S. I. Hayakwawa, originally an immigrant himself, proposed a constitutional amendment to make English the country's official language. Specifically, the proposed amendment would have barred the federal government and all states to make any law requiring the use of any language other than English, though it would allow educational instruction in another language for transitional purposes. The proposal did not make it out of Congress, but Congress has occasionally considered statutes accomplishing largely the same thing since then. In 1996, Official English got its biggest federal success when the House of Representatives passed the "Bill Emerson English Language Empowerment Act of 1996," which would have placed an affirmative obligation on federal government officials to "preserve and enhance the role of English as the official language of the Federal government." This obligation would have included encouraging greater opportunities for learning English, ensuring that no one would be denied governmental services because he or she spoke only English, and conducting all naturalization ceremonies entirely in English. The Senate did not pass a parallel bill and this act did not become law. Official English has been more successful at the state level. Since 1981, almost every state has considered and 22 states have adopted some form of law or state-constitutional amendment (Arizona's amendment, however, was challenged as unconstitutional in the late 1980s and finally, definitively declared unconstitutional on procedural grounds in 1998). Four other states (Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts and Nebraska) passed such laws before 1981. In addition, Hawaii passed a law adopting both English and Hawaiian as its official languages in 1978. On the other hand, the movement has also given rise to laws that protect the use of languages other than English and encourage the study of foreign languages. In 1989, New Mexico, Washington and Oregon passed "English Plus" laws that protect the use of languages other than English and encourage the study of foreign languages. Census data shows that most Americans do speak only English at home. According to 1990 census data, about 86 percent of persons 5 years and older spoke only English at home. Of the remaining 14 percent, Spanish is the most common language spoken other than English, and most people who speak a language other than English at home also speak English with full proficiency. Still, many people speak English with less than full proficiency, and many speak no English at all. About 8.7 percent of Chinese speakers and about 8.4 percent of Spanish speakers have no proficiency in English. About 6.3 percent of Portugese speakers and about 5.4 percent of Korean speakers cannot speak any English at all. The following graph shows the 15 languages other than English that are most commonly spoken in homes, broken down by such speakers' proficiency in English. Of these languages, Spanish is by far the most commonly spoken, with 17.34 million speakers, or more than half of all people who speak another language besides English at home. French is the second-most-common with 1.7 million speakers. Chinese is fifth, with 1.25 million speakers.  |
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