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Warnings of terrorist attacks (last updated August 15, 2004)
Fahrenheit 9/11 suggests that the Bush administration has been trying to keep the American public scared and off-balance through the use of vague terror warnings coupled with assurances that things are all right.
Since September 11, 2001, the Bush administration has issued many warnings of further, imminent, yet unspecified attacks on the United States, while also urging the American public to go about their lives in a more or less normal fashion. Since it unveiled the color-coded threat advisory system in March 2002, it has raised the national threat level to orange or "high" five times, twice before the war in Iraq.
Some have criticized such warnings and threat advisories, questioning the basis for the warnings and whether they accomplish any good given the public's already heightened awareness of terrorism after the September 11, 2002 attacks compared to beforehand. Fahrenheit 9/11 also suggests that the Bush administration used such warnings to help build more support for the war on Iraq.
February 2003
Perhaps the most potentially questionable or significant period of warning was the February 2003 time period, when the Bush administration was building its case for war in Iraq and when it raised for the second time the color-coded threat system from "elevated" to "high." At that time, the Bush administration was continuing its buildup towards war and large protests were being organized around the world. On February 5, Secretary of State Colin Powell made his case against Iraq to the United Nations Security Council.
On February 7, the Bush administration raised the threat level from "elevated" (yellow) to "high" (orange), citing "specific intelligence" that had been "corroborated by multiple intelligence sources." Attorney General John Ashcroft said at the time that al-Qaeda leaders had "emphasized planning for attacks on apartment buildings, hotels and other soft or lightly secured targets in the United States."
Public concern about terrorism rose dramatically in light of the announcement. The Gallup organization found in a February 7-9 poll that 48 percent of those polled were very or somewhat worried about them or a family member becoming a victim of terrorism, with only 18 percent not worried at all, which led to a "net concern" of 30 percent. This was more than twice the "net concern" just weeks earlier.
No attack came in the following week, nor did any news of arrests or new evidence.
Public concern dropped dramatically even as the threat level continued at "high," falling to a level not seen in more than a year. The Gallup organization found in a February 17-19 poll that the "net concern" had dropped to 5 percent, with only 33 percent of those polled being worried and 31 percent being not worried at all.
The Bush administration then announced on February 27 that the threat level was being lowered to "yellow." It said that the lowering was "based on a careful review of how this specific intelligence has evolved and progressed over the past three weeks, as well as counter-terrorism actions we have taken to address specific aspects of the threat situation. Among the factors we considered was the passing of the time period in or around the end of the Hajj, a Muslim religious period ending mid-February 2003."
By contrast, the Bush administration had given arguably more specific evidence for the raising and lowering of the threat level during the September 11-24, 2002 period, the first time that the threat level was raised to "high." The Bush administration at the time cited several pieces of evidence for raising the level, such as "debriefings of a senior al Qaeda operative," and pointed specifically to possible attacks "timed to coincide with the anniversary of the September 11th attacks." The Bush administration then explained the lowering as the result of specific actions such as arrests in suburban Buffalo and in Pakistan, Singapore, and Yemen, as well as the passing of September 11 and a review of intelligence.
Psychological Critique
While the February 2003 threat level remained at "high," psychology professor Philip Zimbardo of Stanford University wrote an essay criticizing the Bush administration's use of alarms, particularly the February 7, 2003 announcement. He wrote that alarms should be based on reliable evidence, should be specific, should motivate people, and should call for concrete action, and that the Bush administration's warnings have failed on all counts:
| "These alarms worked to create high levels of citizen fear, which over time morphed into generalized anxiety. There was no concrete action that citizens might take, other than to remain on alert and to keep their eyes open. … The psychological situation worsened when cognitive-emotional dissonance was induced by the administration's collateral message to "go about your business as normal." How is that possible after having declared the nation is under potential terrorist threat and our personal safety and security is about to be violated once again as it was on 9/11? The resulting sense of confusion spills over into feelings of helplessness and results in less than optimal information processing that would be essential to cope with terrorist attacks. It was never clear why the government had to warn the general public and not just relevant security forces at local and national levels since given that there was nothing meaningful we could do other than to become open-eyed worriers." |
In his essay, Zimbardo raised concerns that the "mismanaged alarm procedures" were helping terrorists who put out false evidence and thus can "stir [] up the desired national turmoil and wast[e] a lot of money in heightened security - without terrorists having to engage in any suicidal attacks." He also raised concerns that the false alarms "reinforce a public willingness to spend huge sums on military defense spending and homeland security" and "create a climate of hostility and danger that encourage moral disengagement in accepting restrictions on personal freedoms, and ignoring human rights violations." Zimbardo also raised concerns that the government was using the alarms to justify the war in Iraq, singling out the alarm put out shortly after Secretary of State Colin Powell's February 2004 presentation to the United Nations Security Council.
| "Even assuming no manipulative intent, conscious or coincidental of the kind outlined here, there needs to be a serious reevaluation of how to best construct such future alarms, guide their optimal utilization and explain to the public why they do not materialize when they do not ... Of course, we are all relieved when the alarms prove false rather than true, but when repeated over time they may serve only to induce a psychic numbing, lulling us asleep and unprepared to act constructively and effectively when the wolf does come to our door." |
Critics say that the Bush administration has continued this pattern of warnings. For example, on Dec. 21, 2003, Department of Homeland Security head Tom Ridge increased the threat level to "high" and warned that "strategic indicators [of an attack], including al-Qaida's continued desire to carry out attacks against our homeland, are perhaps greater now than at any point since September 11th, 2001." Weeks later, Ridge announced that the threat level was being decreased and cited only a "careful of the available intelligence" and the "passing of the holidays and many large gatherings that occurred during this time."
Public warnings from October 2001 through August 2004
(back to top)
| Date of warning
| Explanation of warning
| Date of lifting of warning
| Explanation of lifting
|
| 10/11/01
| FBI: "Certain information, while not specific as to target, gives the government reason to believe that there may be additional terrorist attacks within the United States and against U.S. interests overseas over the next several days."
| N/A
| N/A
|
| 10/29/01
| Ashcroft: "The administration has concluded, based on information developed, that there may be additional terrorist attacks within the United States and against United States interests over the next week."
| N/A
| N/A
|
| 12/3/01
| Ridge: "Increased volume in level of activity involving threats of terrorist attacks. This information we have does not point to any specific target either in America or abroad. And it does not outline any specific type of attack."
| N/A
| N/A
|
| 9/10/02
| Threat level raised to high (orange). Ashcroft: "Possible attacks" on United States interests overseas timed to coincide with the 9/11/01 anniversary based on "debriefings of a senior al Qaeda operative"
| 9/24/02
| Statement: Reduction due in part to arrests of six men in suburban Buffalo and to captures of al Qaeda members in Pakistan, Singapore and Yemen
|
| 2/7/03
| Threat level raised to high (orange). Statement: "Recent intelligence reports, corroborated through multiple intelligence sources, suggest an increased likelihood that the al Qaeda terrorist network may attempt to attack Americans in the United States or abroad."
| 2/27/03
| Statement: Reduction due to intelligence developments, counter-terrorism actions, and passing of the time period in or around the end of the Hajj
|
| 3/17/03
| Threat level raised to high (orange). Statement: Terrorist attacks expected against U.S. and coalition targets in the event of a U.S.-led military campaign against Iraq.
| 4/16/03
| Statement: Reduction due to intelligence developments
|
| 5/20/03
| Threat level raised to high (orange). Statement: "The U.S. Intelligence Community believes that Al-Qaida has entered an operational period worldwide, and this may include attacks in the United States."
| 5/30/03
| Statement: Reduction based on intelligence developments, passing of Memorial Day holiday.
|
| 9/4/03
| Department of Homeland Security sent out an advisory indicating concern, but did not raise the threat level at this time
| N/A
| N/A
|
| 12/21/03
| Threat level raised to high (orange). Ridge: "The U.S. intelligence community has received a substantial increase in the volume of threat-related intelligence reports. These credible sources suggest the possibility of attacks against the homeland around the holiday season and beyond. The strategic indicators, including al-Qaida's continued desire to carry out attacks against our homeland, are perhaps greater now than at any point since September 11th, 2001."
| 1/9/04
| Statement: Reduction based on a review of intelligence and the passing of the holidays.
|
| 8/1/04
| Threat level raised to high (orange) for financial services sector in New York, northern New Jersey, and Washington DC. Ridge: "Reports indicate that al-Qaida is targeting several specific buildings."
| N/A as of 10/2/04
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Sources: Lydia Saad, Public relieved about terrorism as "orange" alert drags on, Gallup News Service, February 25, 2003. Professor Phillip G. Zimbardo, The Psychology of Terrorist Alarms (February 26, 2003) (on-line at here and with a response here. The Bush administration's warnings are available on-line in several locations. The October 11, 2001 warning is on-line here, the October 29, 2001 warning is on-line here, and the December 3, 2001 warning is on-line here. Subsequent warnings are generally available via the Department of Homeland Security on-line here.
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