An independent guide to the issues and questions raised in Michael Moore's Fahrenheit 9/11 By Stephen Lee creator of FootnoteTV

	Before 9/11 9/11 Saudi Arabia Afghanistan Terror Iraq Iraq Cont. Bush Index: Before 9/11 Previous | Next Terrorism policies before 9/11 (last updated October 1, 2004) (back to top) Initial briefings and issues Immediate actions August 2001: Presidential Daily Briefing Prior actions by the Clinton administration Fahrenheit 9/11 criticizes President George W. Bush for not acting on the terrorist threat looming during the first months of his administration, suggesting that he did not pay sufficient attention to the issue. Whether he could or should have done more, Bush actually did receive some information and was briefed several times on Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaeda, even before the August 6, 2001 presidential daily briefing devoted to possible attacks in the United States itself. Moreover, while Bush did not take action in response to the USS Cole attack of October 2000, Bush administration officials did develop a long-term plan for pressuring the Taliban to give up Bin Laden in the months and weeks before the Sept. 11 attacks. Initial briefings and issues (back to top) Bush was briefed about al-Qaeda during the presidential campaign in September 2000 by a CIA official. Bush also may have discussed al-Qaeda with President Bill Clinton in a two-hour discussion in December 2000. Clinton wrote in his 2004 autobiography "My Life" that he told Bush that he thought the biggest security problems "in order, would be Osama Bin Laden and al Qaeda; the absence of peace in the Middle East; the standoff between the nuclear powers India and Pakistan, and the ties of the Pakistanis to the Taliban and al Qaeda; North Korea; and then Iraq," and that one of his biggest disappointments was "not getting Bin Laden." Bush told the 9/11 Commission that he did not remember Clinton saying much about al-Qaeda. As president, Bush did not have any meetings with counterterrorism chief Richard Clarke about terrorism, as indicated in Fahrenheit 9/11, but he did receive other briefings about Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaeda in 2000 and 2001. According to the 9/11 Commission, Bush received 35 presidential daily briefings that related to Bin Laden or al-Qaeda before the Aug. 6, 2001 briefing that warned of Bin Laden's intent to attack in the United States. One immediate issue that Bush inherited from Clinton was whether to take any response to the Oct. 12, 2000 attack on the USS Cole in the Yemeni port of Aden, which resulted in the deaths of 17 sailors. With less than a month before the general election, Bush told CNN that "I hope that we can gather enough intelligence to figure out who did the act and take the necessary action. There must be a consequence." The Clinton administration did not take any direct action in response to the attack during its final three months. Clinton wrote in his 2004 autobiography "My Life" that he considered launching a missile strike against Bin Laden in response, but that the "CIA recommended that we call it off at the last minute, believing that the evidence of his presence was insufficiently reliable." Clinton also wrote that he considered larger military options, but felt that such were "not feasible without a finding of al Qaeda responsibility" for the attack. According to the 9/11 Commission, Clinton told them that if he had received a definitive judgment from the FBI and CIA as to al-Qaeda's responsibility, he would have sought an ultimatum from the United Nations Security Council, given the Taliban a few days to comply, and taken military action against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. On the other hand, some suggested to the 9/11 Commission that the Clinton administration was not interested in getting a final judgment given its ongoing work in the Middle East and the short amount of time remaining in the administration. In any event, CIA Director George Tenet briefed Bush about the Cole investigation on January 25 and informed him about the CIA's "preliminary judgment" that al-Qaeda was responsible. The 9/11 Commission reported that Bush told them that he had not wanted to conduct an air strike that might not be effective and that might give Bin Laden more propaganda. Other administration officials indicated that no formal decision ever was taken to act on the Cole, and that some thought that too much time had passed since the Cole attack to respond just to that. According to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice's testimony before the 9/11 Commission, Bush's position was that he was "tired of swatting at flies" and wanted to take the offense against al-Qaeda. The 9/11 Commission reported that Bush told them that he wanted a long-term policy. Such a strategy was developed over the months and weeks before September 11. Deputies to Cabinet-level officials met in full committee on April 30, 2001 to discuss al-Qaeda and terrorism, and Cabinet-level officials approved a draft directive in their first Principals Committee meeting on al-Qaeda on September 4. Deputies then met again on September 10 to finalize a three-year plan that would first pressure the Taliban to oust Bin Laden and ultimately use covert action to overthrow the Taliban if necessary. Clarke has criticized the Bush administration for reacting slowly to the threat posed by al-Qaeda, noting among other things that he had requested the Principals Committee on al-Qaeda since the Bush administration began. Clarke sent National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice several notes urging a decision as to whether the Bush administration would treat al-Qaeda as a serious threat. The 9/11 Commission noted that Clarke's arguments had force but also noted that Clarke had "often failed to persuade [federal] agencies to adopt his views, or to persuade his superiors to set an agenda of the sort he wanted or that the whole government could support." Immediate actions (back to top) While the Bush administration did not take any military or covert actions against al-Qaeda in its first months, the Bush administration did take some political actions directed against al-Qaeda. Bush wrote Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf about pressuring the Taliban about al-Qaeda in February 2001 and again in August 2001. Rice also discussed al-Qaeda with Pakistan's foreign minister in June 2001. As seen in Fahrenheit 9/11, State Department officials also met with a visiting Taliban official in Washington DC March 2001. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said on March 19, 2001 that State Department officials had stressed that the Taliban must give Bin Laden over for trial and must close terrorist camps. Administration officials also took precautionary measures in the summer of 2001 in response to threat reports indicating possible attacks against U.S. interests overseas. The government reacted with steps such as closing one embassy and raising the force protection levels for U.S. troops in six countries to the highest level. More broadly, the Bush administration did propose an increase in the federal government's counterterrorism budget, just as the Clinton administration had done in each of the immediately preceding years. The federal government spent $6.06 billion to combat terrorism in FY1998, $8.32 billion in FY1999, and $8.69 billion in FY2000 and it enacted $9.70 billion for FY2001. Even before the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration requested $10.33 billion to combat terrorism, an increase of 6.5 percent above the prior year's enacted amount and a 70 percent increase from FY1998. August 2001 (back to top) On August 6, 2001, while in Texas for a working vacation, Bush received a daily briefing entitled "Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US." The title of this briefing was not known by the general public until April 9, 2004 and most of the document itself was declassified and released two days later. The PDB was written in response to requests over the summer by George W. Bush for information about a possible attack by Osama Bin Laden against the United States, a subject that had not been covered in any of the prior PDBs concerning Bin Laden or al-Qaeda. Two CIA analysts who were involved in writing the PDB told the 9/11 Commission that they wanted to "communicate their view that the threat of a Bin Laden attack in the United States remained both current and serious." Former CIA counterterrorism official J. Cofer Black told the 9/11 Commission that he took the PDB as a "reminder" that even though intelligence at that time indicated that al-Qaeda was looking to target locations in Saudi Arabia, Israel or Europe, Bin Laden's "ultimate objective" was to "strike hard against the United States." The PDB was ultimately written based on past reports and a discussion with an FBI analyst, and without the benefit of a full review of available information. In fact, several top domestic law-enforcement officials, such as Attorney General John Ashcroft and then-acting FBI director Thomas Pickard, told the 9/11 Commission that they were not aware of Bush's request. Pickard told the 9/11 Commission that had he known about Bush's request, he would have "pulsed" all FBI agents for whatever information they had on possible attacks. Accordingly, the PDB did not incorporate information that was being developed in the summer of 2001, such as one FBI agent's concerns about an "inordinate number of individuals of investigative interest" attending flight schools or the search by some FBI and CIA officials for individuals who had participated in a high-level al-Qaeda meeting in Kuala Lumpur and who were now in the United States. Bush does not appear to have received information about those leads - or about the subsequent arrest on August 16 of the so-called "20th hijacker" Zacarias Moussaoui - until after the September 11 attacks. The 9/11 Commission reported that it found no indication that Bush discussed the PDB with his top advisors afterwards. Rice told the 9/11 Commission that she did not remember whether she discussed it with him, and Tenet similarly told the 9/11 Commission that he did not recall any discussions with Bush about domestic threats afterwards and that no new action was taken because he believed people were already doing what needed to be done. Bush himself told the 9/11 Commission that the PDB was historical in nature and that he found it "heartening" that the FBI had 70 investigations of people associated with Bin Laden underway. For the text of the PDB, go here. Prior actions against al-Qaeda (back to top) Evaluating whether Bush could have done more before the Sept. 11 attacks probably should be considered against the backdrop of the threat posed by al-Qaeda even before the USS Cole bombing as well as considered against prior U.S. actions against al-Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden. The United States recognized Osama Bin Laden as a threat in the mid-1990s even before any direct attacks against the United States. The State Department mentioned him in a 1997 report as an international terrorist financier who was supporting freelance, transnational terrorists, and arguably even treated Bin Laden in 1998 and 1999 as a threat equal to if not greater than state sponsors of terrorism by including Bin Laden in the section of its annual terrorism reports dedicated to state sponsors rather than in the section dedicated to foreign terrorist organizations. In August 1998, al-Qaeda bombed two U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, resulting in the deaths of more than 300 people. In response, the United States launched missile strikes against targets in Afghanistan and a Sudanese pharmaceutical plant. These strikes were criticized by some at the time as attempts to divert attention from the ongoing controversy surrounding Clinton's relationship with Monica Lewinsky. The Clinton administration did not launch any more strikes against al-Qaeda or the Taliban, but did take some political actions including new sanctions. 1995-96: The United States encouraged Sudan to expel Bin Laden and encouraged Saudi Arabia to take Bin Laden into custody. Saudi Arabia refused, and Bin Laden left Sudan for Afghanistan in May 1996. The 9/11 Commission found no credible evidence to support Sudan's later claim that it had offered to give Bin Laden to the United States; it noted that President Bill Clinton had said in a 2002 speech that Sudan had made such an offer, but that Clinton had told the 9/11 Commission that he had "misspoken" based on press stories he had read afterwards. Early 1998: CIA officials developed a plan to capture Bin Laden in Afghanistan. The 9/11 Commission reported that some people saw the plan as flawed and unlikely to succeed, and the plan was not carried out. April 1998: The State Department recognized Osama Bin Laden as "one of the most significant sponsors of Sunni Islamic terrorist groups" in its annual Patterns of Global Terrorism report for 1997. April 1998: U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Bill Richardson visited Afghanistan during a trip to South Asia, marking the first visit of any high-level U.S. official to Kabul in decades. In the course of the visit, Richardson asked the Taliban to turn over Bin Laden to the United States. The Taliban replied that they did not know where Bin Laden and that Bin Laden was not a threat to the United States. May 1998: CIA Director George Tenet visited Saudi Arabia and asked for the government's help with Bin Laden. Prince Turki bin Faisal then met over the summer with Mullah Omar and other Taliban leaders to urge them to expel UBL and received a commitment that UBL would be handed over. Mullah Omar reneged on this promise in September 1998 and denounced the Saudi government, which suspended relations with the Taliban but did not make a final break. June 1998: A New York federal grand jury indicted Bin Laden on charges of murdering U.S. nationals outside the United States, conspiracy to murder U.S. nationals outside the United States, and attacks on a federal facility resulting to death. This indictment was initially sealed; it was unsealed and made public on November 4, 1998. August 20, 1998: In response to the Aug. 7 bombings of two embassies in Kenya and Tanzania that resulted in the deaths of more than 300 people, the United States launched missile strikes against targets in Afghanistan, including a camp where the CIA believed Bin Laden was meeting with advisors, and a Sudanese pharmaceutical plant. The missile strikes hit targets but did not kill Bin Laden; CIA Director George Tenet later told the 9/11 Commission that he believed that the strikes had been just a few hours off. The Taliban seemed to consider expelling Bin Laden in response to the strikes, but then reneged on its earlier promise to Saudi Arabia to do so. In the United States, the strikes were criticized by some as an effort to distract attention from the ongoing controversy surrounding President Clinton's relationship with Monica Lewinsky. August 20, 1998: Clinton signed Executive Order 13099, which imposed economic sanctions on Bin Laden and al-Qaeda. December 1998: Clinton spoke with Pakistan President Nawaz Sharif about the problem posed by Osama Bin Laden. December 1998: Clinton approved a memo allowing the killing of Bin Laden if the CIA and tribal forces determined that it was not possible to capture him. The 9/11 Commission reported that only a "tiny number" of people knew about this memo, as it effectively authorized the assassination of Bin Laden. The 9/11 Commission reported that top Clinton administration officials and Congressional leaders were briefed. December 1998 - March 1999: Missile strikes against Osama Bin Laden were planned three times but were cancelled due to insufficient intelligence. June 7, 1999: Bin Laden was added to the FBI's "Ten Most Wanted Fugitives." The United States offered a reward of up to five million dollars for information leading to his arrest and conviction. July 4, 1999: Clinton spoke with Pakistan President Sharif again about Bin Laden. Clinton wrote in his 2004 autobiography "My Life" that U.S. officials began training 60 Pakistani troops to serve as commandos to go into Afghanistan to get Bin Laden; Clinton wrote that he was skeptical about the plan but that it was in any event cancelled when General Pervez Musharraf deposed Sharif in October 1999. July 4, 1999: Clinton designated the Taliban as subject to sanctions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act for harboring Bin Laden. The Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control subsequently blocked millions of dollars of assets that the Taliban held in U.S. banks. October 1999: The U.S. State Department formally designated al-Qaeda a foreign terrorist organization. October 15, 1999: The United Nations' Security Council issued Resolution 1267 imposing sanctions on Afghanistan's Taliban government for failing to close terrorist training camps and for continuing to harbor Osama Bin Laden. The Security Council decided that all states shall deny permission for any Taliban aircraft to take off or land in any other state and that all states shall freeze the Taliban's financial resources. The Security Council had previously issued resolutions condemning the Taliban but had not imposed sanctions. Fall 1999: The CIA adopted a new strategic plan for capturing Bin Laden, but the 9/11 Commission reported that "no option was rated as having more than a 15 percent chance of achieving that objective." December 1999: Amidst concerns about a millennium-timed attack, the State Department sent a message to the Taliban that they would be held responsible for any attack by al-Qaeda. General Anthony Zinni asked Pakistan President Musharraf to take action regarding Bin Laden. Neither effort resulted in any further actions. March 2000: Clinton visited Pakistan and again raised the Bin Laden problem; Pakistan responded that it had to support Taliban but would engage them and try to moderate behavior. Fall 2000: The CIA and the military flew an unmanned drone called the Predator over Afghanistan 16 times to develop better intelligence on Bin Laden. A debate later ensued over whether to arm the Predator with missiles so that it could launch an attack. October 12, 2000: An attack on the USS Cole in the Yemeni port of Aden resulted in the deaths of 17 sailors. The 9/11 Commission reported that the CIA and the FBI did not reach a firm conclusion as to al-Qaeda's responsibility for the attack during the remainder of the Clinton administration. According to the 9/11 Commission, Clinton said that if he had received a definitive answer, he would have sought an ultimatum from the United Nations Security Council, given the Taliban a few days to comply, and taken military action against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. December 19, 2000: The United Nations' Security Council issued Resolution 1333, reiterating the demands issued in Resolution 1267 (1999), but imposing additional sanctions on the Taliban. Under this resolution, states shall also prevent the Taliban's acquisition of weapons and any training of military in Afghanistan, close all Taliban and all offices of Ariana Afghan Airlines offices outside Afghanistan, and freeze all of Osama Bin Laden's funds. Sources: The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (July 2004). Richard Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror (Free Press, 2004). Bill Clinton, My Life (Alfred A. Knopf, 2004). The Office of Management and Budget's 2001 Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism is available as a PDF file on-line here. back to top		Index / Home About this site Updates/Blog Search via Google Mailing List FootnoteTV ® Best viewed with small text size. Before 9/11 * Voting problems in the 2000 election * Calling the election * Congressional Black Caucus's objections * Bush’s first months in office * Terrorism policies pre-9/11 * Plans and leads
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